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     Abstract 
This study examines the impact of Asian financial crisis on central bank independence 
and governance in the Asia Pacific. It applies a unique CBIG index-model for 36 
countries for the period 1991 to 2005. This paper examines changes in the CBIG in the 
Asia Pacific before and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. It applies a panel data 
pooled regression model and finds that the Asian financial crisis dummy is significantly 
different in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. As a result the 
improved CBIG in the post-crisis period has contributed to lower the inflation in the 
entire region.  
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1.0 Introduction 
A financial crisis may originate from or triggered by many factors, but ultimately it becomes the 
responsibility of the government and the central bank to manage and recover from the crisis. A poor 
performance by the central bank may often increase the length and severity of any crisis. An 
independent operation of central bank is mostly hindered by the political interference by the 
government. A government which does not allow higher central bank independence and governance 
(CBIG), interferes more in central banking activities. So, the central bank would perform poorly in 
any crisis situation as a political government would always try to follow its political agenda first. As a 
result, a government mostly fails to recover from the crisis and the need for an independent monetary 
authority intensifies. The objective of this paper is identify whether the governments of the Asia 
Pacific allowed higher CBIG after experiencing the financial crisis in 1997, where poor CBIG was 
partly blamed for severity of the crisis. 
The paper’s main contributions include establishing a strong relationship between Asian 
financial crisis and CBIG in the Asia Pacific. The study also confirms that CBIG has improved after 
Asian financial crisis and this has contributed to reduce inflation. Moreover, this study also finds that 
CBIG relationship with inflation is not as effective in low income countries compared to high income 
countries. These outcomes should have significant policy implications and suggests possible 
directions for improvements in CBIG. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: CBIG and 
the Asian financial crisis are presented in Section 2 while data and methodology is described in 
Section 3. Empirical results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 2.0 CBIG and the Asian Financial Crisis 
The central banks always have a great role to play during any financial crisis. Initially the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 started as a currency crisis in a few countries; however, 
ultimately it was turned into a regional financial crisis. A number of factors were identified as 
the possible reason for this crisis. Few specific factors which affected the normal operation of 
central banks include: excessive interference by the government, the inability of the central 
bank to manage exchange rate system, connected lending in the banking system, poor 
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regulation and supervision1 of financial institutions and the central bank’s inability to manage 
the overall situation. A summary of few such studies that investigates the role of central bank 
during the Asian financial crisis is shown in Table1. 
Prior to the crisis, Asia’s developing countries had attracted almost half of total global 
capital inflow in the region. However, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea Republic (South 
Korea) had large current account deficits and their pegged exchange rates encouraged 
external borrowing and that led to excessive foreign exchange exposure in both the financial 
and corporate sectors (Sugisaki 1997). With a speculative attack on various currencies, the 
governments (central banks) sought to protect them by selling dollars from their foreign 
exchange reserves, buying their own currencies, and raising interest rates to foil speculators. 
In addition the economies were overburdened by excessive domestic money supply 
expansion by the central banks combined with burdensome government regulations, and 
other government interference in the marketplace (Johnson and Sweeney 1997).  
One distinguishing element of the crisis was the collapse of the pegged exchange rate. 
Fragile and illiquid banks prevented central banks from further rising of interest rates 
sufficiently to defend their exchange rate pegs. When their international reserves were 
exhausted, the pegs were abandoned and exchange rates plummeted (see Table 1). This 
triggered a rapid deterioration of the situation. In Thailand for example, the central bank 
initially wanted to protect those domestic institutions that had borrowed massively in US 
dollars to underwrite a speculative building and asset boom rather than protecting the 
currency first (Krugman 1998; Krugman 2000). The Thai central bank has since admitted that 
its actions will cost the Thai tax payers dearly for years to come. It not only lost US$23 
billion in its unsuccessful support of the Baht, but also another US$25 billion in a similarly 
unsuccessful support of its failing financial institutions (Swan 1998). 
                                                   
1   In Asia, most of the central banks were responsible for supervising of financial institutions.  
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Like Thailand a currency mismatch was also a problem in Korea and a major factor in 
Indonesia but less so for Malaysia. The Malaysian central bank adopted effective regulatory 
ceilings on foreign currency borrowing and lending and so precluded much accumulation of 
foreign currency denominated debt. As a result, the crisis and depreciation of the Malaysian 
currency created no foreign debt problem, and thus Malaysia did not require an IMF rescue 
(Corden 2007). 
The currency and exchange rate problem connected lending and poor central banks 
supervision all damaged the inner strength of local financial systems. The central bank and 
the banking sector were very much influenced not just by the government but also political 
parties (Nanto 1997). In Indonesia for example the politically connected groups could and did 
escape supervision frequently in the 1990s. One bank with a related party loan exposure 
amounting to 60 percent of its base capital was not punished by the regulators (Ariff and 
Khalid 2000). Moreover, the central bank also failed to manage the situation because of other 
inappropriate policies. Instead of giving guarantees, the central bank in Indonesia issued large 
loans to private banks so they could repay their depositors. Much of these funds however 
were subsequently converted in to foreign exchange and repatriated. The banks then failed 
with these advances unpaid, adding significantly to Indonesia’s fiscal burden. In Thailand, 
suspending private banks encouraged some debtors to those banks to cease repayments, 
adding to the strategic debtor problem (Scott 2002). 
The direct interference by the government, political leaders and parties also preclude 
central banks from achieving their objectives. The politicians for example may receive legal 
and sometimes illegal contributions from businesses. In return, they may approve legislation 
and use their influence with the bureaucrats to direct scarce capital toward favoured 
companies (Nanto 1997). The President of Indonesia showed a continuing involvement in the 
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loan decisions of both state-owned and private banks. Any financial regulators who attempted 
to enforce prudential rules on connected financial institutions was removed including the 
head of the central bank in 1992 and the minister of finance in 1996  (Cole and Slade 1998). 
The Bank of Korea also once functioned as the executor of government policies. Its role was 
to assist policy-makers in obtaining the desired levels of economic activities through 
interventionist policies as shown in Table 1. Its central bank decision was determined by the 
government through a three-tiered system of decision making (Ariff and Khalid 2000). In 
Thailand too it was doubtful whether the Bank of Thailand had much control over its losses 
when its decisions were essentially subject to “persuasion” from the government and finance 
ministers (Swan 1998). In mid 1997, the newly appointed Finance Minister paid an 
unannounced visit to the Bank of Thailand and discovered that almost all of the country’s $30 
billion in foreign exchange reserves has been committed in forward contracts, while another 
$8 billion had been used by its Financial Institutions Development Fund to prop up struggling 
finance companies. As a result the new Finance Minister declined to re-capitalise one of the 
largest finance company’s “Finance One” with public money, and so allowed it to fail. This 
action was seen a betrayal of the government’s promise to foreign bankers and institutional 
investors that their investment would be protected. So, ultimately, foreign capital fled from 
the country and forced the Thai government to devalue the currency and request IMF 
assistance (King 2001).  
Higher CBIG would help central banks manage such situations in future (Swan 1998), 
particularly in maintaining inflation. Managing inflation better would improve CBIG, as the 
former is considered a proxy of the latter in previous studies (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 
1992). After the crisis many countries amended their acts to make their central bank and other 
related agencies more independent and unbiased in the hope that good governance and 
discipline in the financial system might help avoid any further such disasters.  
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3.0 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data: This study covers 36 countries2 from five regions of the Asia Pacific (see Table 
2). The sample consists of eight South Asian, seven South East Asian, seven East Asian, six 
Central Asian and eight Pacific countries. This paper adopts the definitions and index-model 
developed by Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008)3. This index in very unique, as this 
addresses many of the problems present in previous CBI indices, such as, fewer variables4, 
overlaps5, governance6, subjectivity7 and the focus of the indices8. The CBIG index data 
covers 15 years; from 1991 to 2005. The macroeconomic data were sourced from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank and World Economic Outlook of the International 
                                                   
2     Macao-SAR and Hong Kong-SAR are each Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China 
rather than independent countries. Each nevertheless operates its own currency and financial system, so each are 
treated separate from China.  
3  The detailed index construction procedure is shown in Appendix. The main equation to calculate CBIG overall index 
is explained by following equation. This overall CBIG index (CBIGOverall) in constructed with the six sub-indices 
(CBIGLeg, CBIGPol, CBIGPStab, CBIGForx, CBIGMonPol, CBIGAccTrans).  
 
CBIGOverall =  w1CBIGLeg + w2CBIGPol + w3CBIGPStab + w4CBIGForx +w5CBIGMonPol + 
w6CBIGAccTrans  
Where, 
CBIGLeg =  Legal Index of CBIG  
CBIGPol =  Political Index of CBIG  
CBIGPStab =  Price Stability Objectives Index of CBIG 
CBIGForx =  Exchange Rate Policy Index of CBIG  
CBIGMonPol =  Monetary Policy and Deficit Financing Index of CBIG 
CBIGAccTrans =  Accountability and Transparency Index of CBIG 
Weight=  w1= 5/26; w 2=3/26; w3=3/26; w4=3/26; w5=6/26; w6= 6/26. 
 
The variables are equally weighted to construct the sub-indices and the overall index. The proportional weights of the 
sub-indices in the overall index reflect the actual number of variables in each divided by the total number of variables 
26. 
4  This suggests that the highest number of variables in any previous study was 16 (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 
1992), whereas Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008) has 26 variables in their index. 
5  This indicates to the use of some common variable(s) by different authors in their CBI indices. They may have named 
their indices differently however created an overlap due to use of common variables (Ahsan, Skully and 
Wickramanayake 2008).  
6  It refers to the absence of governance indicators in the previous indices as they focused on CBI only. But in this index 
Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008) have combined independence and governance indicators and named the 
index as CBIG. 
7  This specifies the robustness of the index constructed. There are some subjective decisions making involved in index 
construction process.  Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2009) measure content validity and reliability of their 
indices to identify its robustness. They calculated Lawshe’s (1975) content validity ratio (CVR); test-retest and 
Cronbach alpha; in all cases the CBIG index was found highly content valid and reliable.  
8  This CBIG index has six sub-indices and one overall index. The six sub-indices focus on six different aspects whereas 
the overall index measures the entire performance. 
 
 6
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
3.2 Research Design: The main components of research design include testing the 
relationship between CBIG proxy and Asian financial crisis dummy by the equation (1).  
 
CBIG Perform = βo + β1CBIGOveralltk + β2ASCRIS_Dummytk + β3 CIL_Dummytk 
  + β4MoneyGtk + β5RInttk + εtk 
(1) 
This equation was tested using FGLS model after controlling for CBIG (overall), real 
interest rate (Rinttk), country income-level dummy (IL_Dummytk) and money supply growth 
(MoneyGtk). The tests follows standard diagnostics and specification tests as explained in the 
following section. Two Asian crisis dummy was utilised to improve the robustness of the 
findings. The first dummy covered pre-crisis period as 1991-1997 and post-crisis period as 
1998-2005, in the context of total availability of data from 1991-2005. Now, an argument 
may be made that 1998 -2005 cannot be considered as the post-crisis period as few countries 
were still within the crisis even after few years of main crisis in 1997. Or in other words, it 
took few years for the countries to fully recover from the financial crisis. So, an alternative 
dummy with post-crisis period as 2000-2005 was used in the equation (1). 
3.2.1 Diagnostics, Specifications and Robustness Analysis:  This section explains the 
diagnostic tests for the data set, specification tests for the regression model and robustness 
test on CBIG index. The diagnostics tests include stationarity9 check by Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test; multi-collinearity was avoided by keeping highly correlated variables in 
separate models. Hetroskedasticity is addressed by applying robust standard error method. So 
the covariance matrix is corrected via the White’s (1980) correction test. The annual inflation 
                                                   
9    Stationarity is used as a tool in time series analysis (Gujarati 2003); this paper uses panel data, however the 
stationarity check has been done for both CBIG index values and other variables as a robustness check. 
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(π) figures were converted to transformed inflation 10 (YD) to ameliorate potential 
hetroskedasticity problem (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; de Haan and Kooi 2000; 
Ja'come and Va'zquez 2005); finally, autocorrelation among the error terms were examined 
by the Wooldridge (2002) test. 
The estimation-effect test for panel (pooled) data used the Hausman (1978) test to 
decide between fixed-effect and random-effect of pool estimation. It identified the fixed-
effect as the better estimation method, but the fixed estimation method does not produce 
robust results with a invariable data set (Wooldridge 2003). The CBIG data set suffers from 
invariability as CBIG acts do not change frequently. The Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) model in a panel (pooled) data set was therefore applied to test the relationship 
between CBIG and inflation. The FGLS produces better results in a sample of diverse 
country-specific characteristics and corrects for cross-section hetroskedasticity (Nowak-
Lehmann, Vollmer and Martínez-Zarzoso 2007). The 36 sample countries (central banks) 
also come from different income groups (low-, mid- and high-income) (see column 5 of 
Table 2). Cross-section weights were applied to this model. The assignment of cross-section 
weights configures an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to a Feasible Generalized Least Square 
(FGLS) model.  
 Several refined samples were utilized to measure the robustness of the main finding 
(negative relationship between CBIG proxy and Asian financial crisis dummy). Initially, the 
relationship was tested with full sample then the same relationship (CBIG proxy-Asian 
financial crisis) was also tested in four other refined samples: countries with central banks 
only; ones with monetary authorities only; inflation in targeting countries for 1991-2005; and 
finally replacing Asian crisis 1997 dummy with Asian crisis 2000 dummy in columns 3, 4, 5 
                                                   
10    Transformed inflation ( )π
π
+= 1DY
. 
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and 6 of Table 4 respectively.  
4. 0 Statistical Relationship between CBIG and Asian financial crisis:  
The main finding is that after the Asian financial crisis, inflation (YD) the proxy of CBIG, has 
significantly declined. At the same time inflation and CBIG index showed a significant negative 
relationship. So it means that increase in CBIG (index) associates with significant decrease in CBIG 
proxy (inflation) and this reduction in inflation is also significant after the Asian financial crisis, 
which in turn indicates increase in CBIG level after the financial crisis as well. This negative 
relationship is as expected, in that a highly independent central bank should have better control over 
inflation (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992). The Asian financial crisis dummy is highly 
significant (at 1%) in full sample (column 2 of Table 4); in inflation targeting countries 1991-2005 
sample (column 5 of Table 4); and in full sample with modified Asian financial crisis dummy 
(column 6 of Table 4). All these test results improves the robustness of the findings and makes it a 
strong case that the CBIG has significantly improved after the Asian financial crisis. The importance 
of the finding here is that the Asia Pacific sample consists of a high proportion of developing 
countries. As developing countries often experience high inflation, such a robust negative relationship 
between CBIG and inflation, it is often attributed to a two-way causality between them (Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapti 1992). A Granger causality test of CBIG and inflation, however, finds no two-way 
causality but rather CBIG only Granger cause on inflation in the Asia Pacific as reported in Table 5. 
This view is supported by an earlier finding of Cukierman, Webb and  Neyapti (1992) where no two-
way causality was found in a sample of developed and developing countries.  
The adjusted R square value shows that 21.62% of the variations in the regressand (inflation) 
are influenced by the regressor(s) (CBIG overall) in the full sample (column 2 of Table 4).  The 
strength of the overall test is confirmed by a highly significant F statistics (at 1%). The results of four 
control variables in equation (1) are presented in the following few paragraphs. These variables 
include Asian financial crisis in 1997 dummy (ASCRIS1997), Income level of the countries dummy 
(IL_Dummy), money supply growth (MoneyG) and finally, real interest rate (Rint). All the variables 
of equations (1) are defined in Table 3. 
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The Asian financial crisis dummy (ASCRIS1997) is negative and highly significant (at 1%) 
(see column 2 and 5 of Table 4) and shows that the inflation dropped sharply in the post-crisis-period 
(1998-2005) compared to the pre-crisis period (1991-1997). An alternative Asian financial crisis 
dummy (ASCRIS2000) also indicates the same outcome, where the inflation has dropped in the post-
crisis period (2000-2005) compared to the pre-crisis period (1991-1997) (See column 6 of Table 4). 
This may suggest that central banks played an important role in the post-crisis inflation reduction as 
price stability is the primary duty of a central bank. This is an important finding as during the Asian 
financial crisis, the central banks were partially blamed for failing to manage inflation and for a poor 
governance structure (Cole and Slade 1998). Several Asian countries addressed this by amending 
central bank objectives to concentrate more on price stability as well as more independence and 
governance. These changes may have contributed to reduced inflation in the post-crisis period.  
The income level dummy (IL_Dummy) is positive and highly significant. It means that the 
average inflation in the low-income Asia Pacific countries was higher than the middle and high-
income ones. In general, the central banks in low-income countries with low CBIG appeared less 
successful in controlling inflation. This may reflect a politically motivated monetary policy where 
price stability was often sacrificed as well as the lack any inflation targeting program11. Prior research 
suggests that low-income countries show less clear-cut relationship with CBIG and inflation 
(Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992; Loungani and Sheets 1997; Hall and Franzese 1998). Though, 
low-income countries had relatively higher inflation than middle and high income countries in this 
study, they did not affect our overall negative relationship finding.  
Money supply growth (MoneyG) also showed a highly significant positive relationship with 
inflation in the Asia Pacific. Money supply may be not the only determining influence on inflation but 
it is an important one (Kwon, McFarlane and Robinson 2006).   
The real interest rate (Rint) in the equation has a negative and significant relationship with 
inflation in the Asia Pacific. This finding is supported by Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and  
                                                   
11  Low-income countries with no inflation targeting include: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Cambodia, Laos PDR, Solomon Islands, Tonga (see Tables 13-17). A few others like Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Vietnam and Vanuatu (see Tables 13-17) also ran inflation targeting program jointly with their government. 
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Webb (1993)12. This suggests that the real return to savers in short-term financial assets remains 
below its competitive equilibrium level due to government regulation and periodic inflation surprises, 
(as identified by Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and  Webb 1993). The lower the CBIG, the 
further below its equilibrium value is the real return to savers. As the majority of the lower CBIG 
countries in the Asia Pacific are low or middle income countries, this negative relationship also may 
be an indicator of financial repression;13 as Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1993) 
found that the financial repression reduces as the CBIG increases.  
5.0  Conclusion 
This paper examined the relationship between CBIG proxy and Asian financial crisis in 36 Asia 
Pacific countries in a pooled model. The main statistical findings include a strong negative 
relationship between CBIG proxy and Asian financial crisis dummy after controlling for other 
variables.  
This study provides several contributions to the central bank independence and 
governance literature. The key one is to find out that the CBIG has increased in the post-crisis 
period. This suggests that governments have realised that low CBIG was insufficient to 
manage the crisis and so CBIG has been enhanced accordingly. This higher CBIG also seems 
to help moderate inflation. Then it also confirmed a robust negative relationship between 
CBIG and inflation. Inflation is an important monetary policy tool and there are policy 
implications in identifying its correct relationship. These findings should help resolve any 
unclear direction of relationship evident in previous studies.  
Finally, this is the first study to test CBIG increase in the post-crisis period. The Asia 
Pacific is mostly overlooked in the previous works. Moreover, there were no work to check 
                                                   
12  Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and  Webb (1993) found that there is a positive association between real interest 
rate and CBI and a negative relationship between CBI and inflation. So it suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between real interest rate and inflation. 
13  McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) were the first to define financial repression, as the set of government legal 
restrictions preventing the financial intermediaries in the economy from functioning at their full capacity level. 
Broadly speaking, financial repression implies a lack of depth of financial intermediation in developing financial 
markets of the world. 
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whether the CBIG has changed after experiencing such severe financial crisis. So this adds to 
the CBIG literature in this respect as does the dataset utilised (1991–2005). 
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Table 1 CBIG and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
Author(s) Comments 
Corden 
(2007) 
A Thai financial crisis was thus already under way when, in 1997, a speculative attack 
on the Baht finally forced the central bank to give up the fixed exchange rate regime and 
allow the Baht to float. The currency mismatch problem was an important factor in 
Thailand and Korea, and a major factor in Indonesia, but it was not a factor at all in 
Malaysia as its central bank had effective regulations that set ceilings on foreign 
currency borrowing or lending. As this allowed very little accumulation of foreign 
currency denominated debt, the depreciation of the Malaysian currency created no 
foreign debt problem. Thus Malaysia did not need the IMF to rescue it.  
Scott 
(2002) 
Instead of giving guarantee to depositors the central bank of Indonesia issued large 
loans to private banks to ensure they could repay depositors; many of these funds were 
subsequently converted to foreign exchange and repatriated but little was repaid, adding 
significantly to Indonesia’s fiscal burden. In Thailand, suspending private banks 
encouraged some debtors to those banks to cease repayments, adding to the strategic 
debtor problem.  
King 
(2001) 
In Thailand, the newly appointed Finance Minister in mid 1997 paid an unannounced 
visit to the central bank and discovered that almost al of the country’s $30 billion in 
foreign exchange reserves has been committed in forward contracts, while another $8 
billion had been used by the central bank’s Financial Institutions Development Fund to 
prop up struggling finance companies. The new finance Minister has no choice but to 
renege on the government’s promise to re-capitalise Finance One (the largest Thai 
finance company) with public money, allowing it to fail. This action was seen a betrayal 
of the government’s promise to foreign bankers and institutional investors that their 
investment would be protected. Foreign capital fled, forcing the Thai government to 
devalue the currency and seek IMF assistance.  
Ariff and 
Khalid 
(2000) 
The Bank of Korea functioned as the executor of government policies. Its role was to 
assist the policy-maker to bring about desired levels of economic activates through 
interventionist policies. The decisions taken by the central bank are determined by the 
government through a three-tiered system of decision making. In Indonesia the 
politically connected groups could and did escape supervision. One bank, for example 
was allowed to retain a related party loan exposure amounting to 60 percent of the base 
capital. This could not have been done without the complicity of the central bank.  
Swan 
(1998) 
The Bank of Thailand has admitted that its actions will cost the Thai taxpayer dearly for 
many years to come. The Bank lost US$23 billion in trying to prop up the Baht prior to 
its collapse on the 2nd July 1997 when it was floated. In addition, it lost another US$25 
billion or A$37 billion in an unsuccessful support of failing financial institutions. It is 
doubtful if Bank of Thailand had very much control over these losses when it is 
essentially subject to “persuasion” from the Government and finance ministers. Greater 
independence, such as that possessed by New Zealand central bank, would be of 
particular assistance to central banks in the region.  
Chang 
(1998) 
One of the distinguishing elements of the crisis was the collapse of fixed exchange rate. 
Fragile and illiquid banks prevented central banks from raising interest rates sufficiently 
to defend their exchange rate pegs, but this could last only until international reserves 
were exhausted, at which point the pegs had to be abandoned and exchange rates 
plummeted.  
Cole and 
Slade 
(1998) 
The President of Indonesia showed a continuing involvement in the loan decisions of 
both state-owned and private banks. Any financial regulators who attempted to enforce 
prudential rules on connected financial institutions were removed from their position, 
including the MD of the central bank in 1992 and the Finance Minister in 1996.  
Krugman 
(2000, 
1998) 
The Bank of Thailand could use US dollar reserves to protect the artificially high value 
of the currency. Perhaps the aim was to protect poorly supervised domestic financial 
institutions that have borrowed massively in US dollar denominated currency to 
underwrite the speculative building and asset boom underway. If the Baht depreciated, 
these borrowers would be unable to repay their loans in US currency. A finite supply of 
US dollar reserves could be used to protect the overvalued Baht.  
Johnson 
and John 
(1997) 
The crisis in Asian countries was due to excessive expansion of domestic supplies by 
central banks combines with burdensome government regulations, protection of 
domestic industries, and other government interference in the marketplace.  
 13
Table 2 The Sample 
 Country Year  Established Central Bank’s Name Income Level 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
South Asia    
1 Afghanistan 1939 Da Afghanistan Bank LI 
2 Bangladesh 1971 Bangladesh Bank LI 
3 Bhutan‡ 1982 Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan LI 
4 India 1934 Reserve Bank of India LI 
5 Maldives‡ 1981 Maldives Monetary Authority LM 
6 Nepal 1956 Nepal Rastra Bank LI 
7 Pakistan 1956 State Bank of Pakistan LI 
8 Sri Lanka 1949 Central Bank of Sri Lanka LM 
South Ease Asia    
9 Cambodia 1955 National Bank of Cambodia LI 
10 Indonesia 1953 Bank of Indonesia LM 
11 Laos 1990 Bank of the Lao PDR LI 
12 Malaysia 1958 Bank Negara Malaysia UM 
13 Philippines 1949 Central Bank of Philippines LM 
14 Thailand 1942 Bank of Thailand LM 
15 Vietnam 1976 State Bank of Vietnam LI 
East Asia    
16 China 1948 People’s Bank of China LM 
17 Hong Kong -SAR‡ 1993 Hong Kong Monetary Authority HI 
18 Japan 1882 Bank of Japan HI 
19 Korea Rep 1950 Bank of Korea HI 
20 Macao-SAR‡ 1989 Monetary Authority of Macao HI 
21 Mongolia 1924 Bank of Mongolia LI 
22 Taiwan 1923 Central Bank of China HI 
Central Asia    
23 Azerbaijan 1991 National Bank of the Azerbaijan LM 
24 Kazakhstan 1993 National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan LM 
25 Kyrgyzstan 1992 National Bank of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan LI 
26 Tajikistan 1991 National Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan LI 
27 Turkmenistan 1993 State Central Bank of Turkmenistan LM 
28 Uzbekistan 1995 Central Bank of Uzbekistan LI 
Pacific    
29 Australia 1959 Reserve Bank of Australia HI 
30 Fiji 1973 Reserve Bank of Fiji LM 
31 New Zealand 1934 Reserve Bank of New Zealand HI 
32 Papua New Guinea  1973 Bank of Papua New Guinea LI 
33 Samoa 1974 Central Bank of Samoa LM 
34 Solomon Islands 1976 Central Bank of Solomon Islands LI 
35 Tonga 1988 National Reserve Bank of Tonga LI 
36 Vanuatu 1980 Reserve Bank of Vanuatu LI 
Notes: LI=Low income, LM=Low middle income, UM=Upper middle income, HI=High income ‡Monetary 
Authority (MA). 
Source: Author’s compilation from different sources, such as World Development Indicators (WDI), World 
Economic Outlook, CIA World Fact Book, and central bank web sites 
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Table 3 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Description 
This table delineates the variables definition of the model of relationship between actual CBIG and 
Asian financial crisis. Generally it is expected that as central banks have amended their Acts to improve 
its condition after Asian crisis, so in the post-crisis period CBIG should improve (inflation should 
decrease) compared to the prior crisis period. The data for this model are collected from WDI database 
and CBIG index is constructed for all countries.  
Panel A(1): Dependent Variable 1 
CBIGOverall CBIG overall 
index 
Equal average of 26 variables of all indices or proportional 
average of sub-indices (CBIGLeg + CBIGPol + CBIGPStab + 
CBIGForx + CBIGMonPol + CBIGAccTrns) 
Panel A(2): Dependent Variable 2 
CBIG Proxy   Inflation  Yearly change in the average Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Transformed inflation (YD)
Panel B: Asian Financial Crisis Dummy 
ASCRIS_Dummy
1997 
Asian financial 
crisis dummy 
This dummy separate the time period before and after Asian 
financial crisis as 1991 to 1997 = 0 and 1998 to 2005 =1. 
ASCRIS_Dummy 
2000 
Asian financial 
crisis dummy 
This dummy separate the time period before and after Asian 
financial crisis as 1991 to 1999 = 0 and 2000 to 2005 =1. 
Panel C: Control Variables 
IL_Dummy Low-income 
countries 
dummy 
A dummy to distinguish a low-income country from mid- and 
high-income countries. Here, low-income countries = 1, 
otherwise 0.
MoneyG Money supply 
growth 
Average annual growth rate in money and quasi money. 
Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside 
banks, demand deposits other than those of the central 
government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency 
deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. 
This definition is frequently called M2. 
RInt Real interest 
rate 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for 
inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
and data files using World Bank data on the GDP deflator. 
 
Table 4 Relationship between CBIG and Inflation 
This table assesses the statistical relationship between CBIG Proxy and Asian financial crisis dummy by applying Panel (pooled) in FGLS model in the following equation:  
 
 
CBIGProxy = βo + β1CBIGtk + β2ASCRIS_Dummytk + β3IL_Dummytk + β4MoneyGtk + β5Rinttk + εtk ………………………………………….(equation 1) 
 
 
CBIG proxy is Inflation (transformed, YD), defined as the percentage change in the consumer price.  CBIGi is an index measuring central bank independence and governance by a 
overall index (CBIGOverall). The control variables include Asian financial crisis in 1997 (ASCRIS_Dummy) dummy (pre crisis period 1991 to 1997 = 0 and post crisis period 1998-
2005 =1); Income level of the countries dummy (IL_Dummy) (low-income countries = 1, middle- and high income countries = 0); money supply growth (MoneyG) is average annual 
growth rate in money and quasi money (M2); and finally, real interest rate (Rint) is defined as the lending rate adjusted for inflation. Five different samples tested include: full sample 
(supposed to be 36 but 6 dropped by Eviews); CBs only (26 central banks only); MAs only (4 monetary authorities only); Inflation targeting 1991-2005 (13 inflation targeting countries 
only); Asian crisis 2000 dummy (full sample of 30 countries).  
 
The main finding is that The post Asian financial crisis period has experienced significantly lower inflation (indicates improvements in CBIG) than that of pre-crisis period. The test also 
identifies a significant negative relationship between the CBIG proxy (inflation) and CBIG as it was expected. So it means an increase in CBIG (overall) contributes a significant 
decrease in inflation. The low –income countries are subject to significantly higher inflation than that of middle-and high-income countries. Finally, an increase in money supply growth 
results in significant increase in inflation; but an increase in real interest rate contributes to a significant decrease in inflation.  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CBIG Proxy (Dependent) Full Sample CBs only MAs only Inflation Targeting (1991-2005) Asian Crisis 2000 Dummy 
Constant 25.37418*** 43.73136*** -0.171212 22.90940*** 42.75564*** 
CBIG (Overall) index -2.339457** -2.203861** 3.267626*** -1.890924* -2.437294** 
Asian Financial Crisis Dummy -3.065404*** -1.872647* 0.841723 -5.322290*** -2.780040*** 
Income Level Dummy 7.329980*** -2.618961*** -2.792801*** 0.676403 -2.136269** 
Money Supply Growth (%) 4.256754*** -12.81738*** -0.361612 -7.857482*** -12.51945*** 
Real Interest Rate (%) -2.583928** 4.593763*** -1.730870* 2.075176** 4.408823*** 
Adj. R2 0.216231 0.2674 0.078571 0.358021 0.29964 
F- Statistics 0.00000*** 0.0000*** 0.125563 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Cross Section 30 26 4 13 30 
Total Pooled Unbalanced Observations 379 364 50 160 379 
Period 1991-2005 1991-2005 1991-2005 1991-2005 1991-2005 
 “***”, “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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  Table 5 Granger Causality Tests for CBIG (overall) and Inflation 
This table presents the result of a two-way Granger causality between CBIG and inflation, by applying the 
following equations: 
 ( ) ttDttDtttt YYCBIGOALLCBIGOALLCBIGOALL εββααα +++++++= −−−− ...... 111110    (12) 
                                               ( ) tttttDttDtD uCBIGOALLCBIGOALLYYY +++++++= −−−− ββααα ....... 111110                  (13) 
                           
 
Here, CBIGOALL = CBIG (overall) index, YD= Transformed inflation, YDt-1 = Lag of Transformed inflation 
and εt = ut = error term. The equation (12) shows the relationship that CBIG (overall) Granger cause inflation and 
equation (13) explains that inflation Granger cause CBIG (overall).   
 Null Hypothesis: Observations F-Statistic Prob. 
 CBIG (overall) does not Granger Cause Inflation (YD)  407  2.95023 0.0125
 Inflation (YD) does not Granger Cause CBIG (overall)  0.33362 0.8925
The null hypothesis for inflation (YD) does not Granger cause CBIG (overall) is not rejected but we do reject that 
CBIG (overall) does not Granger cause inflation (YD). This suggests that CBIG can affect on the inflation (YD), 
but the reverse is not true. So, two-way causality is not found in the Asia Pacific.   
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Appendix: CBIG Index Format 
1. LEGAL (CBIGLeg) Coding 
a. Term of office of Governor / CEO (TOG)  
7 years or more 1.00 
6 years 0.80 
5 years 0.60 
4 years 0.40 
Below 4 years 0.20 
Not Mentioned 0.00 
The longer the appointment, the higher the score. 7 years was set as the longest appointment as no 
Governor/CEO has been found to be appointed of more than 7 years. The score reduces gradually with 
fewer years. Any value less than 4 years is usually less than the term of the government so gets equal 
score. The lowest score is assigned if the term is not mentioned even if there is a practice to appoint for 
a certain number of years. When the Act makes no mention of term of appointments then legally it 
becomes very weak and receives a zero score. When the term is not a specific number of year (e.g. 4) 
rather a range of years (e.g. 4 to 6 years), then the average of the range used (e.g. 4+6=10/2=5).  
b. Legal power to appoint Governor/ CEO (LPA)  
Board of the central bank 1.00 
Parliament/Legislature 0.67 
Government but need parliament consent 0.33 
Government/ Executives alone 0.00 
A Governor/CEO appointed by the central bank’s board is considered the most independent 
appointment. The Governor/CEO can be appointed solely by a parliament/parliamentary committee 
without any involvement of the government.  When the government appoints/selects but still needs 
approval or at least has to inform the parliament, then it is considered better than government appointing 
the Governor/CEO alone.    
c. Legal power to Dismiss Governor/ CEO (LPD)  
No provision for dismissal 1.00 
Board of the central bank 0.67 
Parliament/Legislature or Government but approved by the parliament  0.33 
Government/ Executives alone 0.00 
Where the Act precludes the Governor/CEO from being terminated or only for physical and mental 
disability then highest score assigned. The next best is the power rest with board of the central bank, 
then the power is with the parliament or at least require parliament’s approval. The lowest score is 
where the government can act alone.  
d. Reappointment of Governor/ CEO (RAG)  
Yes, there is provision of reappointment 1.00 
Not mentioned  0.50 
No, provision 0.00 
If it is mentioned in the law that it permits reappointment then scores highest and lowest for having no 
provision. Not mentioning anything is considered better than no provision as the Governor/CEO still 
could be reappointed in this case whereas it is not possible at all when  the provision is bared.  
e. Regulatory and supervisory power of central bank (RSC)  
Yes, completely separated 1.00 
Jointly done by central bank and other authorities  0.50 
No, only by central bank 0.00 
A completely separated authority receives highest score, central banks managing jointly with others 
scores better than central banks doing it alone.  
CBIGLeg =  w1TOG + w2LPA + w3LPD + w4RAG + w5RSC 
Where, w1= w2= w3= w4= w5 
2. POLITICAL (CBIGPol) Coding 
a. Turnover of Governor/CEO (TRG)  
Governor/CEO changed after 1 year or more of government’s change  1.00 
Governor/CEO within 1 year of government’s change 0.50 
Governor/CEO within 6 months of government’s change 0.00 
Governor/CEO changed after one years or more time since a new government takes over the power 
scores highest, changed within one year ranked second and changed within six months is the worst 
example of political influence getting lowest score.  
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b. Members of the management board of central bank (CMB)  
Non-government persons  1.00 
Not mentioned government or non-government persons 0.67 
Government employees 0.33 
Government ministers  0.00 
When the members of the board comes from non-government sources like business and academics then 
they are assigned highest score. Where government or non-government positions are not mentioned it is 
still considered better than having mentioned about government employees or ministers. Between 
government employees and ministers, ministers are assigned lower score as they are more powerful in 
implementing the government’s agenda.  
c. Governor/CEO holds other office in the government (GOO)  
No, Governor/CEO does not  1.00 
Yes, but with prior permission from government  0.50 
Yes, always  0.00 
It scores highest when the Governor/CEO does not hold any other position within the government. If the 
Governor/CEO holds a position with the prior permission of the government, it is assigned better score 
than the Governor/CEO is an ex officio government employee.  
CBIGPol =  w6TRG + w7CMB + w8GOO 
Where, w6= w7= w8.  
3. PRICE STABILITY OBJECTIVES (CBIGPStab) Coding 
a. The major objectives of the central bank (MOB)  
Price stability as the only objective of the bank 1.00 
Price stability is one objective with other compatible objectives 0.67 
No objectives stated in the bank charter 0.33 
Stated objectives do not include price stability 0.00 
Highest score assigned when the central bank has only one objective of price stability. The second 
highest score assigned when price stability is one of the objectives among other compatible objectives. 
If there is no objectives mentioned in the bank charter it is considered better than the situation of not 
including price stability among stated objectives, because not including price stability means totally 
ignoring price stability, whereas it may be an administrative flaws not to include any objectives in the 
charter, while they still may some objectives in place.  
b. Inflation targeting (INT)  
Independently by central bank 1.00 
Jointly with government  0.50 
Not done by the central bank 0.00 
It gets highest score when the inflation targeting is done by central bank alone. When the targeting is 
done by central bank and government jointly through a coordination council then second highest score 
has been assigned. If it is not done by the central bank rather done by the government alone then the 
score allocated is lowest at zero. 
c. Interest rate controlling (INC)  
Independently by central bank 1.00 
Jointly with government 0.50 
Not done by the central bank 0.00 
When the interest rate is controlled by the market or by the central bank without direct or indirect order 
from government then it receives highest score. If done jointly by the government and central bank, it is 
assigned second highest score. The lowest score is if the government does so alone.  
CBIGPStab =  w9MOB + w10INT + w11INC 
Where, w9= w10= w11 
4. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY (CBIGForx) Coding 
a. Foreign exchange market interventions  (FIN)  
By central Bank alone  1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government only 0.00 
Under a fixed, pegged and managed floating exchange rate system, the currency rate needs to be 
stabilized regularly, if the central bank can take action on its own without receiving any directives from 
the central bank then highest score is allocated. When the central bank and government manages the 
exchange rate through a coordination council then it is considered medium CBIG and none when the 
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central bank does not have any say it just have to act upon the order of the government. If the law does 
not mention that who should intervene the market then it is assumed about the government as it is 
expected that if responsibilities were given to the central bank that would have been included in the law.  
b. Foreign exchange market regulations (FMR)  
By central bank alone 1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government only 0.00 
The power to formulate exchange rate policy regulations by central bank gives it complete independence 
to manage the currency market so the highest score is allotted for this category. Regulations formulated 
jointly is considered second best option and regulations formulated by the government only is less 
desired in terms of CBIG and allotted lowest score zero.  When the law does not mention that who 
should regulate the market then it is assumed that the government does so alone.  
c. Foreign exchange borrowings (FBR)  
Central bank has a prominent role   1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government alone 0.00 
When central bank has a prominent role in deciding foreign currency borrowing, it is deemed the most 
beneficial for CBIG and ranked highest. Joint operation is regarded the next best option, whereas, 
decisions taken only by government receives a zero. While the law does not mention who decides about 
borrowing then it is assumed about the government does so alone.   
CBIGForx =  w12FIN + w13FMR + w14FBR 
Where, w12= w13= w14 
5. MONETARY POLICY AND DEFICIT FINANCING (CBIGMonPol) Coding 
a. Responsibility of monetary policy formulation (MPF)  
Central bank alone 1.00 
Central bank participates, but has little influence 0.67 
Central bank only advice government 0.33 
Central bank has no say 0.00 
The responsibility of monetary policy formulation without any direction or influence from any quarter 
enhances the CBIG and so allotted highest score. A central bank which may participate in policy 
formulation but has little influence over a coordination council headed by government representative or 
minister then ranked as second category of CBIG. An instance, where the government only takes advice 
from the central bank but formulate its own monetary policy by its staffs in the ministries then it is 
ranked as third best category. Subsequently if the central bank has so say at all or wholly done by 
government ministries without any role of central bank then it is deemed to lowest rank of CBIG.  
b. The final word in resolution of conflict (FWC)  
The central bank, clearly defined in the law 1.00 
 A council of the central bank, executive branch, and legislative branch 0.50 
Government and Executive branch 0.00 
The final word in the matter of monetary policy should be held by central bank as it ensures highest 
CBIG. If the difference is resolved in a council of central bankers and executives then it reduces the 
status of CBIG. When government retains the power to make final decision or such matters are referred 
to President, Governor General, Prime Minister, Finance Minster or any  such authority then it is ranked 
lowest as there is no CBIG. 
c. Lending to the government (PLN)  
I. Provision for lending  
Not permitted  1.00 
Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15% of government revenue) 0.67 
Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g. over 15% of government revenue) 0.33 
No legal limits on lending 0.00 
In a country when a law/act has been passed that government cannot borrow from the central bank then 
it is allotted highest scores in all four categories. When lending is permitted then ranking has been done 
for each category separately. For a central bank where lending to the government is permitted, first the 
limit of lending is measured in terms of proportion to the government revenue. If it is below fifteen per 
cent of government revenue then the score assigned is 0.67 as highest score is meant to be for the central 
bank which is not allowed to lend. When the limit exceeds fifteen per cent then 0.33 score is put. The 
worst case scenario is when there is no legal limit on lending. 
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II. Terms of lending (TRL)  
Controlled by the central bank 1.00 
Specified by the central bank charter 0.67 
Agreed between the central bank and executive 0.33 
Decided by the executive branch alone 0.00 
In the cases where lending is allowed, the terms and conditions of lending should be controlled by the 
central bank alone. This option is considered better than terms specified by the bank charter as under 
this option central bank can update the terms and conditions depending on the market condition. 
Moreover, central bank charters cannot be amended every year. So once a terms and condition is written 
in the charter it might have to be updated at different times. However, terms and conditions specified by 
the charter also not a weak option and considered better than agreed between central bank and executive 
branch, where it is possible that executive branch may get away with easy terms by influencing the 
central bank authority. The weakest form is when the all terms are made by executive branch alone. 
When there is nothing mentioned about terms and conditions in the Act then it is assumed that 
everything is decided by the executive branch as if there was any intention to give control to the central 
bank then it would have been mentioned in the Act.  
III. Maturity of loans (MLN)  
Within 6 months 1.00 
Within 1 year 0.67 
More than 1 year 0.33 
Not mentioned in the law 0.00 
Shorter the maturity better for CBIG. It is recommended that the borrowing should be may only for six 
months. This option is assigned highest CBIG score, followed by within one year’s option and more 
than one year’s option. If the maturity is not mentioned in the law then it is considered zero CBIG.  
IV. Interest rates on loan  (INL)  
At market rates or above minimum rate 1.00 
Below market rate 0.67 
Interest rate is not mentioned 0.33 
No interest on government borrowing  0.00 
When government borrows at a competitive rate of market rate or at the refinancing rate or above the 
minimum rate then it is delegated highest CBIG score. Below market rate is the next option of setting 
interest rate on loans. No mention of interest rate is considered better than no interest rate on 
government borrowing as under the former category the central bank still may change interest but in 
case of former here is no scope of doing it.  
CBIGMonPol = w15MPF + w16FWC + w17PLN+ w18TRL + w19MLN + w20INL 
Where, w15= w16= w17= w18= w19 = w20
6. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY (CBIGAcctrans) Coding 
a. Objectives of the central bank (WOB)  
I. Written objectives  
Mentioned in the law 1.00 
Not mentioned in the law but evident in other documents 0.50 
Not mentioned 0.00 
Objectives mentioned in the Act are considered best in terms of transparency. If the objectives are not 
mentioned in the law but evident is other documents still carries some amount of transparency compared 
to not mentioning it at all. Some central banks have mentioned about having missions/goals/functions 
instead of objectives. Practically though they are different from each other but here when a central bank 
does not have any objectives but their mission statement/goals/functions are written in such a way that it 
has very similarity with a objective statement then those statement are considered equivalent of 
objectives and assigned marks for them.  
II. Clear priorities in objectives (COB)  
Priorities are distinct and easy to understand 1.00 
Priorities are there, but not distinctly presented 0.50 
No priorities 0.00 
When the specific section of law or any form of statement of objectives mentions the priorities of 
objectives then it is considered best among the options mentioned above. The following category means 
when the priorities are evident from the activities of the central bank or from the speeches of 
Governor/CEO or any other research documents of central bank. Having no proprieties in objectives 
brings no transparencies for central bank.  
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b. Communication strategy  
I. Policy explanations provided for public (PEP)  
Regularly communicated to public 1.00 
Occasionally communicated to public 0.50 
Not communicated at all 0.00 
Regularly communicated to public means that there are set times in a year to publicly disclose policies 
of central bank. Occasionally means that there is no set time to organize policy briefing or there is no 
public briefing at all but policies are communicated through speeches of Governor/CEO or by 
publishing research papers on different occasions. The above two option are top two categories in CBIG 
ranking followed by lowest score of not communicating at all.  
II. Publication of minutes of Board meeting (PMN)  
Minutes are published publicly 1.00 
Minutes are kept but not published 0.50 
Nothing mentioned 0.00 
When the central bank board’s meeting minutes are published for public then it is ranked at the top, 
followed by keeping the minutes but not publishing them. Subsequently lowest score assigned for not 
mentioning anything about meeting minutes at all.  
c. Accountability of the Governor/ CEO (ACG)  
 Board of central bank 1.00 
 Parliament 0.67 
Parliament and government  0.33 
Government only 0.00 
A board of central bank is considered independent of any influences, so a Governor/CEO accountable to 
the board is also assumed as best option of accountability and allotted highest score. The second 
category indicates the Governor/CEO presents its report to the standing committee or directly to the 
session of parliament. When the Governor/CEO has to present report to both government and parliament 
or the Governor/CEO presents its report to the Government and the report is also placed to the 
parliament then they belong to the third category of accountability. If the Governor/CEO is accountable 
to the government then it is considered not favorable to CBIG at all rather it will give the government 
the opportunity to influence central banks activities.  
d. Audit of central bank (ADC)  
 External auditor 1.00 
Internal auditor 0.50 
Nothing mentioned 0.00 
When independent professional auditors or government Auditor General of the country are appointed 
then it is considered external auditors. If the law says the auditors are appointed by the board of the 
central bank or by country’s head of state then it is also assumed that the auditors are external. If the 
audit committee of the central bank or anyone appointed from the current employees of the central bank 
or from the government then they are assumed internal auditor and ranked lower than external auditor as 
internal auditor’s report provide biased report because of its attachments to the central bank or to the 
government.  
 CBIGAccTrans = w21WOB + w22COB + w23PEP + w24PMN + w25ACG + w26ADC 
Where, w21= w22= w23= w24= w25= w26.
CBIGOverall =  w1CBIGLeg + w2CBIGPol + w3CBIGPStab + w4CBIGForx +w5CBIGMonPol + 
w6CBIGAccTrans 
Where, w1= 5/26; w 2=3/26; w3=3/26; w4=3/26; w5=6/26; w6= 6/26.
Notes:  Assigning scores for each variable are based on the written Act, amendments or any other form of 
written documents. In some cases, where there were not enough information available or a specific term is 
explained in a different way than conventional approach or a particular information is very unique for a central 
bank and does not fall into our Index format then few assumptions had been made to complete the scoring or 
some modification have been made to complete the scoring. For example, A Governor/CEO is accountable to 
both central bank board (1.00) and government (0.00), but there is no such category (Board and Government) in 
this index. Whilst this information is very unique to a specific central bank. So, the average of two score has 
been used to decide score for that category. Most of the assumptions are explained under each variable while 
explaining the calculation of scores.  
Source: Ahsan, Skully and Wickramanayake (2008). 
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